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https://github.com/Blah-IM/blahrs.git
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fix(types,blahd): reject timestamps > i64::MAX
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parent
c4fbf1294b
commit
a38b59da84
5 changed files with 27 additions and 12 deletions
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@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ pub struct VerifyError(#[from] VerifyErrorImpl);
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enum VerifyErrorImpl {
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#[error("profile id_key mismatch")]
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ProfileIdKeyMismatch,
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#[error("act_key[{0}] has invalid expiring timestamp")]
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ActKeyTimestamp(usize),
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#[error("act_key[{0}] not signed by id_key")]
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ActKeySigner(usize),
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#[error("invalid act_key[{0}] signature: {1}")]
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@ -66,6 +68,9 @@ impl UserIdentityDesc {
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{
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return Err(VerifyErrorImpl::ActKeySigner(i).into());
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}
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if i64::try_from(kdesc.expire_time).is_err() {
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return Err(VerifyErrorImpl::ActKeyTimestamp(i).into());
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}
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signed_kdesc
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.verify()
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.map_err(|err| VerifyErrorImpl::ActKeySignature(i, err))?;
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@ -335,6 +340,19 @@ mod tests {
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VerifyErrorImpl::ActKeySigner(1),
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);
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// Timestamp overflows i64.
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id_desc.act_keys[1] = UserActKeyDesc {
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act_key: act_pub.clone(),
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expire_time: u64::MAX,
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comment: String::new(),
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}
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.sign_msg_with(&id_key, &id_priv, TIMESTAMP, rng)
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.unwrap();
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assert_err!(
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id_desc.verify(None, TIMESTAMP),
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VerifyErrorImpl::ActKeyTimestamp(1),
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);
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// OK act key.
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id_desc.act_keys[1] = UserActKeyDesc {
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act_key: act_pub.clone(),
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@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ max_page_len = 1024
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max_request_len = 4096
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# The maximum timestamp tolerance in seconds for request validation.
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# NB. This should be small enough to reject timestamps overflowing `i64`,
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# otherwise it may cause panics.
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timestamp_tolerance_secs = 90
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[server.feed]
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@ -432,8 +432,7 @@ pub trait TransactionOps {
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stmt.execute(named_params! {
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":uid": uid,
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":act_key": kdesc.signee.payload.act_key,
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// FIXME: Other `u64` that will be stored in database should also be range checked.
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":expire_time": kdesc.signee.payload.expire_time.min(i64::MAX as _),
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":expire_time": i64::try_from(kdesc.signee.payload.expire_time).expect("verified timestamp"),
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})?;
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}
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@ -537,7 +536,7 @@ pub trait TransactionOps {
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fn add_room_chat_msg(&self, rid: Id, uid: i64, cid: Id, chat: &SignedChatMsg) -> Result<()> {
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let conn = self.conn();
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let act_key = &chat.signee.user.act_key;
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let timestamp = chat.signee.timestamp;
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let timestamp = i64::try_from(chat.signee.timestamp).expect("verified timestamp");
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let nonce = chat.signee.nonce;
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let rich_text = &chat.signee.payload.rich_text;
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let sig = &chat.sig;
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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use std::num::NonZero;
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime};
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use std::time::Duration;
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use anyhow::Result;
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use axum::extract::{ws, OriginalUri};
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@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ use axum::routing::{get, post};
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use axum::{Json, Router};
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use axum_extra::extract::WithRejection as R;
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use blah_types::{
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ChatPayload, CreateGroup, CreatePeerChat, CreateRoomPayload, DeleteRoomPayload, Id,
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MemberPermission, RoomAdminOp, RoomAdminPayload, RoomAttrs, RoomMetadata, ServerPermission,
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get_timestamp, ChatPayload, CreateGroup, CreatePeerChat, CreateRoomPayload, DeleteRoomPayload,
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Id, MemberPermission, RoomAdminOp, RoomAdminPayload, RoomAttrs, RoomMetadata, ServerPermission,
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Signed, SignedChatMsg, UserKey, UserRegisterPayload, WithMsgId, X_BLAH_DIFFICULTY,
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X_BLAH_NONCE,
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};
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@ -103,11 +103,7 @@ impl AppState {
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fn verify_signed_data<T: Serialize>(&self, data: &Signed<T>) -> Result<(), ApiError> {
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api_ensure!(data.verify().is_ok(), "signature verification failed");
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let timestamp_diff = SystemTime::now()
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.duration_since(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
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.expect("after UNIX epoch")
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.as_secs()
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.abs_diff(data.signee.timestamp);
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let timestamp_diff = get_timestamp().abs_diff(data.signee.timestamp);
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api_ensure!(
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timestamp_diff <= self.config.timestamp_tolerance_secs,
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"invalid timestamp",
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@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ async fn register_flow(server: Server) {
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// Sign using id_key.
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let act_key = UserActKeyDesc {
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act_key: CAROL.pubkeys.act_key.clone(),
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expire_time: u64::MAX,
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expire_time: i64::MAX as _,
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comment: "comment".into(),
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}
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.sign_msg(&CAROL.pubkeys.id_key, &CAROL.id_priv)
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